Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 48, Number 3/4 (Fall/Winter 2010)

Article 9

Book Review: From Coexistence To Conquest:
International Law And The Origins Of The ArabIsraeli Conflict, 1891- 1949, by Victor Kattan
Michael Lynk

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Part of the Law Commons
Book Review

Citation Information
Lynk, Michael. "From Coexistence To Conquest: International Law And The Origins Of The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1891- 1949, by
Victor Kattan." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 48.3/4 (2010) : 669-679. http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol48/iss3/9

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

669

Book Review
FROM COEXISTENCE TO CONQUEST: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, 18911949, by Victor Kattan'
MICHAEL LYNK 2
BETWEEN 1915 AND 1917, as part of its eastern strategy during the First World
War, Great Britain made three different promises regarding the future of Palestine
and the Middle East. At the time, Palestine and the neighbouring lands were still
part of the beleaguered Ottoman Empire, and Great Britain was engaged in a
titanic war against Turkey and its allies, Germany and the Austro-Hungarian
Empire. These separate British promises-to the Arabs, the French, and the
European Zionist movement-were ambiguous, laced with imperial self-interest,
and, most tragically for the peoples of the region, irreconcilable with each
other. Almost a century later, the Middle East is still reaping the whirlwind.
To the Arabs living in the Levantine provinces of the Ottoman Empire,
Great Britain promised independence if they would initiate a revolt against
their Turkish masters. In a series of letters exchanged in 1915 and 1916 between
Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Cairo, and Hussein
Ibn Ali, Sherif of Mecca, Great Britain pledged that it would support "the
independence of the Arabs in all of the regions within the limits demanded by
the Sherif of Mecca," which would include much of present-day Syria, Lebanon,
Iraq, Jordan, and Israel/Palestine.' This pledge of support was the most congruent
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with the demographic and cultural reality of Palestine at the time, as these lands
and their peoples had been overwhelmingly Arab in language, culture, and
identity for over a thousand years. Moreover, Arab opposition to Ottoman rule
had been rising steadily over the previous decade, led by a nascent intellectual
class of teachers, army officers, and writers in Damascus, Beirut, and Jerusalem
who were now allied with the warrior tribes from northern Arabia. Palestine,
which was within the scope of the Hussein-McMahon Agreement, was at the
time about 92 per cent Palestinian Arab.
In May 1916, shortly after the last of the McMahon-Hussein letters
were exchanged, Great Britain and France covertly agreed to carve up the
Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire between themselves once the Great
War was over. Under the Sykes-Picot Agreement' (named after the two diplomats who negotiated the terms), Britain would acquire Transjordan,
Gaza, northern Arabia, and much of Mesopotamia, while France would
gain Cilicia, the Syrian and Lebanese coast, Mosul, Aleppo, and Damascus.
Palestine would come under a vaguely defined "international administration"
in consultation with Russia. Absent from the Sykes-Picot Agreement was any
mention of self-determination or the political aspirations of the Arabs living in
these lands.
Great Britain also made a third promise respecting Palestine. On 2 November
1917 the British Cabinet endorsed a letter written by Lord Balfour, the British
Foreign Secretary, to Lord Rothschild, a leading Zionist figure in England. In
what was to become famously known as the Balfour Declaration, Britain
promised its best efforts to establish a national home for the Jewish people in
Palestine, provided that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil
and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights
and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."' The Declaration
was a significant achievement for the small Zionist movement and its leader,
Dr. Chaim Weizmann, which enabled Zionism to receive the political support
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of the most potent European power just as the British army and the Arab
insurgents were amassing to capture Palestine from the Ottomans.
Two of the promises were subsequently kept. After the Great War, the newlyformed League of Nations endorsed the British and French fait accompli and
awarded them mandates over the Arab lands of the vanquished Ottoman Empire.
Great Britain was given the Mandate for Palestine, with the Balfour Declaration
specifically included in the terms of the Mandate. European Jewish immigration
and the building of pre-state Zionist institutions flourished under British rule;
during the Mandate, the demography of Palestine changed significantly as the
Jewish population grew from 8 per cent in 1917 to 31 per cent by 1946. These two
promises were largely compatible with one other, as the fledgling Zionist
movement required a strong and sympathetic European patron to govern
Palestine and facilitate its nascent colonies in the face of an antagonistic
indigenous population.
The burden of the unkept promise, however, was borne by the Arabs, whose
hopes for independence after the First World War were thwarted by the European
mandates. The greatest burden fell on the Palestinians, who opposed the Zionist
project from the start as a mortal threat to their homeland, but whose successive
rebellions in the 1920s and 1930s were routed by the British Mandate army.
Ultimately, with the creation of Israel in 1948 the Palestinians lost their struggle
for Palestine. The 730,000 Palestinians who were expelled from their homes or
fled the fighting became, with their descendants, the world's largest, longestlasting, and most destabilizing refugee problem.
The contradictory promises embedded in these three documents-the
McMahon-Hussein letters, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and the Balfour Declaration-set in motion the political forces that would decisively reshape Palestine
and the Middle East over the next century. In From Coexistence to Conquest:
InternationalLaw and the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1891-1949,' Victor
Kattan, a British international law scholar teaching at the University of London's
School of Oriental and African Studies, provides a well argued, richly documented, and lucidly written history of those early yet monumental years of the
conflict through the lens of the law. In particular, Kattan focuses on the emergence
of Wilsonian self-determination as the question of Palestine sharpened after the
First World War. Using these three documents as his analytical platform, Kattan
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marches historical narrative and legal interpretation forward in a creative lockstep
to explain how, by the end of the thirty-year British rule in 1948, the indigenous
population in Palestine was on the verge of being decisively stripped of its
homeland and its majority status by a European settler-colonial movement. This
almost-complete demographic transformation of a colonial territory in the
modern era was extraordinary, even in the annals of a tumultuous twentieth
century. For Kattan, the struggle for Palestine during the Mandate years presents
both a historical and a legal predicament: how was Great Britain to "implement a
policy that promised two peoples self-determination in the same country without
seriously considering how this could be accommodated,"' especially in the face of
the unified opposition of the majority population?
The historical figure who most prominently stalks the pages of From Coexistence to Conquest is Arthur James Balfour. An unsuccessful prime minister who
subsequently returned to high office as the Foreign Secretary in the British.War
Cabinet, and an anti-Semite who came to embrace Zionism without discarding
all of his prejudices, Balfour was the animating political force within the British
.establishment for the cementing of a diplomatic alliance with Zionism at a time
when the Zionist movement represented only a small minority of British Jews.'
Balfour's significance as a central figure in this story was due, in large part, to his
clear-eyed articulation of British imperial interests in Palestine and the looming
consequences that Zionism presented for the indigenous population. In a 1919
memo to his successor, written shortly after his resignation as Foreign Secretary,
Balfour acknowledged that his 1917 promise of a Jewish homeland in Palestine
entailed the denial of self-determination for the Palestinians:
[F]or in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting
the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country, though the [1919 KingCrane] American Commission has been going through the form of asking what
they are. The four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it
right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long tradition, in present needs, in
future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the
9
700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.
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Later, in a 1923 speech to the English Zionist Federation, Balfour laid out
his justification for this exceptionalism. Motivated by his own Christian Zionism
and by the grander British desire to encourage the growth of a sympathetic
settler population that could secure a strategic territory for Britain as well as
reduce the strain on the imperial treasury by paying its own way, Balfour stated
that the "great experiment" of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, with its civilizing
potential, trumped the Wilsonian principle:
[Tihe critics of this movement shelter themselves ... behind the principle of selfdetermination, and say that, if you apply that principle logically and honestly, it is
to the majority of the existing population of Palestine that the future destinies of
Palestine should be committed. My lords, ladies and gentlemen, there is a technical
ingenuity in that plea, and on technical grounds I neither can nor desire to provide
the answer; but, looking back upon the history of the world, I say that the case of
Jewry in all countries is absolutely exceptional, falls outside the ordinary rules and
maxims, cannot be contained in a formula or explained in a sentence. The deep,
underlying principle of self-determination really points to a Zionist policy, however
little in its strict technical interpretation it may seem to favour it.10

Lord Balfour's Declaration became an intractable'challenge for his successors
as British Foreign Secretary; each would try, and fail, to square the circle over the
next thirty years. Commissions of inquiry were sent off to Palestine after every
episode of rebellion by the Palestinians, and most reported back that the promise
of a Jewish homeland in Palestine was incompatible with the Arab demand for
self-determination." The partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states was
first recommended by the 1937 Peel Commission, which was accepted by some in
the Zionist movement while being adamantly opposed by Palestinians. Britain's
dilemma, and the tragedy embedded in the eventual decision to pursue partition,
was aptly captured in early 1947 by Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, just as
the country was handing over the problem to the United Nations (UN):
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the Arabs for national independence: secondly, their antagonism to the establishment of
the Jewish National Home in Palestine, quickened by their fear of Jewish domination" (at 151).

674

12010148 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

The best partition scheme, and the most favourable one that I have seen up to now,
has the effect that it would leave ... 450,000 Jews and 380,000 Arabs in that Jewish State. I put that to the Arabs quite frankly, and what was their answer? The Arabs say: "If it is wrong for the Jews to be a minority of 331/2 or 40 percent in the
whole country, what justification is there for putting 380,000 Arabs under the Jews.
12
What is your answer to that?" I have no answer.

From Coexistence to Conquest provides a fresh assessment of this critical
period in the history of the modern Middle East. Other recent histories of the
Mandate have proficiently recounted the working alliance between Britain
and the Zionist movement after the Great War, the growth of the Yishuv (the
Jewish community in Palestine), the mounting Palestinian resistance, and the
pattern of imperial perfidy." The uniqueness and the strength of Kattan's
approach is his sophisticated deployment of international law as an analytical
tool to explain and critique what happened in Palestine from the twilight years
of the Ottoman Empire up to the creation of Israel. This focus on the law is
entirely appropriate, for there is no other territorial conflict in the contemporary
world where so much attention has been paid to the importance of formal
legitimacy and legal authority. The 1897 Basel Program adopted by the first
Zionist Congress proclaimed, "The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish
people a home in Palestine secured by public law."" Great Britain took care to
secure the consent of the League of Nations for its Mandate over Palestine and
expressly included the Balfour Declaration as part of its Mandate terms. The
Palestinians framed their pleas for independence from the 1920s forward as the
right to self-determination. The partition of Palestine was endorsed in 1947 by
the UN General Assembly. Virtually all of the subsequent central issues of the

conflict-the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homes, the
various wars between Israel and her Arab neighbours, the status of the Israeli
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settlements, the role of human rights, and the future of Jerusalem-have been
the subjects of scores of UN resolutions and volumes of legal commentary. Yet,
for all of this, the will of the world community to actively apply the content of
international law--especially its stated focus on justice and rights-to resolve the
Arab-Israeli conflict has been strangely inert. As Kattan notes in his introduction,
"[T]he problem is not international law per se but its lack of enforcement; that
in the Middle East international law is closer to power than to justice.""
At the centre of Kattan's argument in From Coexistence to Conquest is his
identification of the two parallel universes of law warring with each other in
Mandate Palestine: one based on the positivist tradition of international law
associated with British imperial rule, including the actual laws of, and the legal
justifications for, the Mandate power, and the other anchored in the normative
rights found in the emerging doctrines of self-determination and human rights.
Through the inter-war period, popular demand for Arab independence was
articulated in the normative rights-based narrative. If the trajectory of modern
international law since the First World War has been characterized by the long
decline of the positivist tradition and the ascension of the modern legal framework
of rights-based norms, then an apposite legal-historical analysis of a particular
colonial relationship would invariably encompass a critical assessment of the
governing forms of the imperial legal system that underpinned the dominantsubordinate colonial relationship. With its exhaustive documentation and its
command of the international legal foundations of the Mandate, From Coexistence
to Conquest is an admirable contribution to the growing library of contemporary critical studies on the role of the law and jurisprudence in maintaining
imperial power.
Three legal themes in particular are highlighted in From Coexistence to
Conquest- the three initial promises to the Arabs, the French, and the European
Zionist movement; the partition decision; and the principle of selfdetermination. Kattan first turns his focus to the legal content of the pledges
made by Great Britain during the Great War, which steered Palestine towards
its unhappy fate. He argues that, even within the traditional prism of positivism
itself, the Hussein-McMahon letters can be considered to be a binding treaty
between Great Britain and the Arabs of the Hejaz, given the capacity of the parties

15. Ibid.at 4.
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.to make a binding agreement." The Balfour Declaration, which acquired
legal status once it was incorporated into the League of Nations' Mandate,
contained a very precise and restricted scope: it promised a Jewish homeland
in Palestine, not Palestine as the Jewish homeland, let alone a Jewish state.
While the Sykes-Picot Agreement was originally a backdoor deal between two
imperial powers, Kattan argues that it grew into the Palestine Mandate which
imposed substantive obligations upon the British. The Mandate, a "sacred
trust of civilisation" in its own words, required Britain to ensure the "wellbeing and development" of the peoples living in Palestine." The role of the
Mandate power was to provide administration and advice in leading the people
of Palestine to independence consistent with the "wishes of these communities.""
Considering the three promises together, Kattan asserts that Britain as the
Mandatory power was vested with "fiduciary duties in relation to the beneficiaries
of this trust who were the indigenous peoples of Palestine."" These promises
should have led to the maturation and eventual creation of a Palestinian Arab
state in all of Palestine, reflecting the wishes and the identity of its majority
population while protecting its minority communities. The fact that Britain,
throughout its administration of Palestine, acted primarily on more disingenuous
motives-its imperial interests in the region and its support for the colonizing
imperatives of the Zionist movement-may come as no surprise to historians
of the Empire, but in the context of Kattan's legal critique these ulterior
motives constitute a profound breach of the' promise to the Arabs and a betrayal
of the Mandate.
The narrative in From Coexistence to Conquest leads inexorably to the
culmination of the unkept promise: the 1947 decision to partition Palestine. By
the end of the Second World War, the two communities-the Arab Palestinians
and the Jewish Yishuv-were articulating utterly irreconcilable futures for
Palestine. The Palestinians wanted a single bi-national state with democratic
institutions and constitutional guarantees for individual, collective, and minority
rights. The Yishuv, recognizing that it was not going to achieve a demographic
majority in Palestine through European Jewish immigration under the British
16.

Ibid. c. 4 at 98ff.

17.

Ibid at 54-55, citing "Article 22, Covenant of the League of Nations" (1920) 1 League of
Nations Official Journal at 9.
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19.
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Mandate, pursued its second-best option: the partition of the country with a
maximum amount of land to allow for the largest possible Jewish majority.
With vastly superior diplomatic influence and panache, and with the indispensible
support of the Truman Administration in the United States, the Zionist
movement's partition proposal gained the crucial endorsement of the UN
General Assembly in November 1947.20
Kattan mounts a number of critiques of the partition plan: the partition
breached the promises to the Palestinians that the future of Palestine would not
be decided without their consent; it was economically unfeasible; it was unenforceable; the partition itself was a gerrymandered process, with the minority
community awarded the majority of the country's land mass, most of the fertile
lands, and all of the good sea ports; and, once executed, the partition plan would
be politically unsustainable because the Jewish state would have a large Palestinian
minority who, in all likelihood, would have resisted the imposition of a raciallybased government and legal system. In law, Kattan argues, the partition of
Palestine violated the principle of majority rule by carving out a separate state at
the instigation of the minority Yishuv community (which was an overwhelmingly
immigrant population), on part of the territory that was integral to the majority
indigenous population.2 1 Citing the rule then emerging in international law, as
expressed in the 1941 Atlantic Chaeter, that "no territorial changes that do
not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned,"22 Kattan
asserts that no justification in law for the 1947 partition can be found in any of
the international instruments then prevailing in the immediate post-war period.23
The question of self-determination and its application to Mandate Palestine
is the thread that runs as the common theme throughout the book. "In many
respects," Kattan asserts, "Zionism was at odds with twentieth-century notions
of self-determination.""' As the concept grew and matured in the years after
1920, self-determination became "inherently anti-colonial and was intricately
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Futuregovernment ofPalestine, GA Res. 181(11), UN GAOR (1947), online: <http://unispal.
un.org/unispal.nsf/a06f2943c226015c85256c40005d359c/7fmaf2bd897689b785256c33006
1d253?OpenDocument>.

21.

Supra note 1, c. 6 at 146ff.

22.

Ibid. at 159, citing "The Atlantic Charter of 14 August 1941," reprinted in (1941) 35 Am. J.
Int'l L. Sup. 191.

23.

Ibid., c. 6 at 146ff.

24.

Ibid. at 117.

678

12010148 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

linked to decolonisation. But what happened in Palestine was precisely the
reverse of decolonisation." 25 The dilemma for the Zionist movement in the
early twentieth century was that it lacked one of the essential pre-conditions
for self-determination: it possessed no territory, and it could only acquire the
necessary homeland to build a state through the auspices of a colonial power
and the unavoidable suppression of the native population, the very antithesis
of what was happening elsewhere. As for the competing interests of the two
communities in Palestine in the Mandate years, Kattan maintains that "international law would give first consideration to the interests of the original and
indigenous inhabitants over those who had recently immigrated there from
overseas." 26 Even by the terms of the British Mandate, Kattan argues, the Zionist
movement may have acquired a
right to determine their own future in Palestine by creating a Jewish national
home, but this could only be established within a Palestinian state. The Mandate
conferred no right on the "Jewish people" to convert Palestine into a Jewish state
to the detriment of the majority Palestinian Arab population.27

The League of Nations' mandate system would eventually wither away
after the Second World War, as the winds of change brought independence to
virtually all of the former Mandate territories. Even South West Africa (now
Namibia) eventually won its independence in 1990 after a prolonged war of
liberation, and both the UN General Assembly and the International Court
of Justice revoked the Mandate of apartheid South Africa over the territory.
Palestine was left behind as an orphan of history-the only mandated territory
under the League of Nations' system that did not become an independent state
of its indigenous peoples.
If Kattan's splendid book has a weakness, it lies in his apparent indecision
over which critical tool of legal-historical analysis to employ. At times, Kattan
assesses the British Mandate by means of a positivist legal critique of its actions,
contrasting the language of Britain's formal pledges to the Arabs with its own
patterns of deceit. With these positivist lenses, Kattan reads the Balfour Declaration
and the League of Nations' Mandate through the eyes of an engaged litigator
searching for language and arguments that would limit the legal reach of these

25.
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26. Ibid. at 126-27.
27. Ibid. at 142.
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documents. On other occasions, Kattan deploys a modernist critique of the
Mandate, applying contemporary historical approaches to the era of late colonialism. This modernist critique is enriched by Kattan's creative use of international
law principles respecting self-determination. The positivist legal critique is the
tool of an advocate, which is powerful but blunt; the modernist critique is the
tool of a historian, which is methodological but not always precise. Both critical
tools are valid, but care has to be taken on how to employ them in unison. As an
example of the liiitation of Kattan's use of these critical tools, the 1947 decision to
partition Palestine is judged in the book to be unfair, unworkable, and a violation
of solemn undertakings, which it surely was. However, the book's primary reliance
on the positivist critique of partition downplays the more penetrating historical
assessment of the phenomenon as an ill-conceived, even cynical, imperial stratagem
that often left fatally fractured societies and regions in its wake-a sort of posthumous revenge of the British Empire. As prime exhibits of the results of such
imperial stratagems, think of Ireland, Cyprus, the South Asian sub-continent, as
well as Israel-Palestine. Had Kattan provided a methodological focus on the
comparative lessons of partition across the British Empire, this would have placed
the endgame in Palestine within a broader picture and provided a more dynamic
understanding of how late imperial policy managed to thwart the rights-based
promise of modern international law in that tormented land.
This quibble aside, From Coexistence to Conquest is a compelling piece of
scholarship, shaped by a well-organized presentation of the mass of historical
information on the Mandate period and supported by over a hundred pages of
impressively sourced footnotes. Its central thesis-that a critical legal-historical
assessment can tell us much about the fateful triangular relationship between the
British, the Palestinians, and Zionism-is a sturdy challenge to the traditional
Exodus-inspired narrative of the origins of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle, and to the
more shaded, if similarly problematic, "competing nationalisms" narrative that has
become ascendant in recent years. The historiography of Palestine and Israel is perhaps the most contested in the modern world, with serious scholarly chronicles on
the Middle East having to rise above the clamour of polemics and nationalism that
litter library shelves. Alas, the same can also be said for some of what passes as legal
scholarship on the topic. Kattan's study climbs high above this din. The lasting
virtue of From Coexistence to Conquest is its salient reminder that the failure of international law to bring about a just and final resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict,
an indelible stain on law's efficacy, was tragically well-entrenched long before 1967.

